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THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UK  
AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aerospace industry is often regarded as one of  Britain’s last remaining 
world class, high technology  manufacturing industries and this paper 
assesses its international competitiveness. Various statistical indicators are 
used to measure competitiveness, based on published data at the industry 
and firm level, supplemented with information derived from company 
interviews.  Indicators include productivity, output, firm size, development 
time-scales, labour hoarding, exports and profitability.   The empirical 
results of this paper suggest that, over the period 1980-2000, the UK 
aerospace industry improved its competitiveness compared with the USA 
and the EU.   
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Introduction 
The UK aerospace industry is often regarded as one of  “Britain’s last remaining 
world class, high technology  manufacturing industries” (SBAC, 2000, p3; IGT, 
2003).  This paper assesses the international competitiveness of the industry. 
Competitiveness is determined by, and reflected in, price-cost factors and non-
price factors.  Price-cost factors reflect industry and company efficiency (eg. 
factor productivity; lean manufacturing), the opportunities for achieving 
economies of scale, scope and learning and the extent of rivalry.  Non-price 
factors include research and development (R&D), development time-scales, 
delivery schedules, export finance, reliability and the provision of spares and 
support over the life-cycle.  A related  taxonomy is that competitiveness is 
embodied in five competitive forces comprising threats from new entrants and 
substitute products and services, the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers and 
rivalry amongst existing competitors.  These five competitive forces are a function 
of industry structure and determine long-run industry profitability (Porter, 1990, 
p35).   
The five competitive forces provide an analytical framework for assessing the UK 
aerospace industry’s competitiveness.  Various statistical indicators are used to 
measure competitiveness, based on published data at the industry and firm level.  
The indicators include productivity, output, firm size, development time-scales, 
labour hoarding, exports and profitability. 
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The UK aerospace industry 
The UK aerospace industry comprises firms involved in the design, development, 
manufacture and support of aircraft, helicopters, missiles and space systems (eg. 
satellites).  It includes aircraft and systems, engines, equipment and maintenance, 
repair and overhaul companies supplying military and civil markets in both the 
UK and overseas.   
Government is central to understanding aerospace industries in the UK and 
elsewhere.  Governments are major buyers of aerospace equipment for their 
armed forces and they can use their buying power to influence the size, structure, 
conduct and performance of their national industries.  Government also influences 
the civil aircraft market through its allocation of national landing and over-flying 
rights, its provision of financial support for civil aircraft development 
programmes and exports, and its ownership and support for national airlines.  In 
the UK, both the aerospace industry and its airlines are privately-owned.    
Table 1 shows some of the UK aerospace industry’s stylised facts.  Over the 
period 1980-2002, real sales and export shares increased whilst employment 
declined substantially.   Also, the relative contributions of military and civil 
markets changed markedly, reflecting the disarmament following the end of the 
Cold War.  The R&D-intensity of the industry is reflected in some 10% of sales 
devoted to R&D.  Even these simple descriptive statistics showing rising trends in 
export shares and a high proportion of output exported suggest that this is a 
competitive industry. This position is reinforced by the fact that in 2002, about 
two-thirds of UK civil aerospace sales were exported.   
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Table 1 here 
 
The UK aerospace industry is highly imperfect comprising domestic monopolies 
in military and civil aircraft (BAE Systems), helicopters (Agusta Westland), and 
engines (Rolls-Royce), a duopoly in missiles (MBDA; Thales: Racal and Shorts 
Missile Systems) and oligopoly in the equipment sector (BAE Avionics; Thales; 
Smiths; Cobham).  The major UK aerospace firms are also partners in European 
collaborative programmes.  BAE is involved in Eurofighter Typhoon (UK; 
Germany; Italy; Spain), Airbus (wings, representing 20% of the Airbus company) 
and missiles (MBDA); AgustaWestland in joint European helicopter programmes 
and Rolls-Royce is a partner in associated European collaborative engine projects.  
BAE dominates the UK aerospace industry, accounting for some 75% of the 
industry’s sales in 2002.  BAE also dominates the UK defence market with its 
involvement as a major supplier of air, land and sea systems as well as defence 
electronics.   
The UK aerospace industry has considerable development and manufacturing 
assets overseas, especially in the USA. For example, BAE owns US avionics 
firms and Rolls-Royce owns the US Allison engine company.  In 2002, total 
employment in the USA of UK aerospace industry assets was almost 26,000 
personnel.  Similarly, many overseas companies have either located in the UK or 
purchased UK aerospace companies (eg. Goodrich; Thales).    
Since the end of the Cold War, the UK, European and US aerospace industries 
have experienced substantial consolidation.  In the UK, major mergers and take-
overs led to the creation of BAE Systems (British Aerospace and GEC Marconi 
Electronics), AgustaWestland (helicopters: a merger between Agusta/Italy and 
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Westland/UK, with the UK interest sold to Agusta in 2004) and the Thales 
acquisition of Racal and Shorts Missile Systems.  In Europe, EADS represented a 
merger of Aerospatiale Matra (France), Daimler Chrysler (Germany) and CASA 
(Spain).  US mergers and take-overs resulted in a smaller number of major 
aerospace companies, forming a major competitive threat to UK and European 
firms.  Boeing acquired Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas; Lockheed Martin 
acquired General Dynamics Aircraft, a merger of Lockheed and Martin Marietta 
and the acquisition of Loral; Northrop acquired LTV Aircraft, then merged with 
Grumman followed by the acquisitions of Litton and Newport News Shipbuilding; 
and Raytheon acquired Beech Aircraft, BAe Business Jet, TI Defence and Hughes 
Aerospace and Defence.   
 
A comparative assessment   
The UK aerospace industry’s position in the world market can be assessed by 
comparing it with the USA, the EU and oth r rivals. The US aerospace industry 
dominates the world market. In 2000/02 and on the basis of sales and 
employment, the US industry was some four times larger than the UK industry; 
and if size indicates the opportunities for achieving economies of scale, learning 
and scope, then the US industry has a competitive advantage over the rest of the 
world.  Outside the EU, other major rivals include Canada and Japan (Table 2).  
Within the EU, the UK aerospace industry is the largest employer followed by 
France, Germany and Italy. 
 
Table 2 here 
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The five competitive forces 
Assessing the industry using Porter’s five competitive forces model requires a 
distinction between military and civil aerospace markets.  In the UK military 
market, the Government is a major buyer and funder of development programmes 
and can use its buying power to regulate profits.  Government also determines 
entry and exit and typically UK defence contracts are subject to competitive 
procurement allowing foreign firms to bid for such contracts.  Usually, there is 
significant rivalry between existing competitors, mainly European (EADS; 
Dassault; Saab) and US firms (Boeing; Lockheed Martin; Northrop Grumman; 
Raytheon).  Oligopoly in the world market results in close substitutes with rivalry 
in combat aircraft and military helicopters.  
However, the threat of new entry is limited, mainly because of high entry barriers 
and costs due to the need for costly and fixed R&D expenditure which on defence 
work is usually borne by government.  Also, further entry barriers arise from 
economies of scale and learning.  Nonetheless, large defence electronics 
companies provide an entry threat.  Substitutes for an effective combat aircraft 
take many years to develop (eg.  10+ years) and whilst buyers are budget-
constrained, they are not price-sensitive.  Rivalry tends to be based on non-price 
factors, especially R&D which determines the technical features of military 
aircraft (eg. speed; range; weapons capability).   
Civil markets are different, especially on the demand side, where governments are 
not major buyers.  UK airlines form a privately-owned oligopsony, dominated by 
British Airways. Within the world market, there are large numbers of state-and 
privately-owned airlines demanding large and regional jet airliners.  There are 
also large numbers of buyers for business jets and for light aircraft for pleasure 
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use.  On the supply side within the world market, there are  duopolies in large jet 
airliners (Airbus, Europe; Boeing, USA)  and regional jet airliners (Bombardier, 
Canada; Embraer, Brazil).  The large jet airliner industry is characterised by high 
entry barriers, reflecting high R&D costs and scale and learning economies.  
However, duopoly results in close substitutes for both regional and large civil 
aircraft. Nonetheless, substitutes for a commercially-successful large jet airliner 
might take some 6 years to develop with break-even occurring some 10-15 years 
into production and pay-back periods extending a further 20 years or more. Even 
on regional jet airliners, orders for 40-60 aircraft are the minimum required for a 
commercial launch.  These unique economic characteristics of civil aircraft 
development mean that this is not a market offering short-term profitability.   
 
Duopoly prime contractors can use their buying power on major new programmes 
to obtain favourable deals with their major suppliers, especially the engine 
companies.  The world aero-engine market is an oligopoly comprising Pratt and 
Whitney (United Technologies, USA); General Electric, USA; Rolls-Royce, UK; 
and Snecma, France.  These companies compete vigorously for their engines to be 
used on new civil aircraft programmes (eg. Airbus 380; Boeing 7E7).  There is 
similar rivalry between a small number of major equipment companies for a share 
of such new projects.    
 
Both the large and regional jet airliner industry has been characterised by exits.  In 
2003, the UK, as a prime contractor, exited from the regional jet airliner market 
(similar exits occurred for Fokker, Netherlands and Fairchild Dornier, Germany).  
However, a number of nations are seeking to enter the regional airliner industry  
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(eg. China; Indonesia; Spain).  For both existing and new entrants, Government is  
involved in the civil aircraft market through the provision of state financial 
support for new aircraft programmes.  The UK Government provides a risk 
sharing, repayable investment in the form of launch investment  with repayments 
through a levy on sales.  Studies of international financial supports show that 
“there is a very large imbalance in the absolute levels of support provided by other 
governments to their civil aerospace industries, particularly the USA, and a 
material imbalance with the rest of Europe”(IGT, 2003).  Estimates show that the 
US support may be at least seven times and possibly as high as twelve times 
greater than the level of support available in Europe.  Despite the lower levels of 
state support available, the UK industry has achieved significant success in 
creating world-class competitors.  However, nations are in a prisoner’s dilemma 
subsidy war which extends to include local and regional government (eg. with 
regions in various nations offering competitive subsidies to attract aerospace 
firms, especially suppliers).        
 
In the Porter model, industries in which the pressure from one or more of the five 
competitive forces is intense are ones where few firms are very profitable for long 
periods (Porter, 1990, p35).  The UK aerospace industry has at least three intense 
competitive forces, namely, powerful buyers in both military (government) and 
civil markets (prime contractors), fierce competitive rivalry and substitute 
products: hence the prediction that UK aerospace will have few firms which are 
very profitable for long periods. The remainder of this paper assesses the UK 
aerospace industry competitiveness using various statistical indicators mostly for 
the period 1980 to 2000. Inevitably, there is no single ‘best’ indicator of 
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performance, so that a balanced assessment requires several performance 
measures. 
 
Assessing the Competitiveness of the UK Aerospace Industry  
(i)  Labour productivity 
Productivity is one of the determinants of competitiveness.  This section focuses 
on industry labour productivity based on sales per employee, since this is the 
measure for which international data are readily available.  The UK aerospace 
industry’s labour productivity relative to the USA and the EU improved over the 
period 1980 to 2000.  The 1980 productivity gap between the UK on the one hand 
and the EU and USA industries on the other was reduced substantially by 2000 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3 here 
 
The DTI publishes an annual Value Added Scoreboard which provides data for a 
sample of UK and European companies (first published in 2002).  These show 
value added productivity defined as value added per employee and value adding  
efficiency or wealth creation which is value added divided by input costs of 
labour and equipment depreciation.  For the combined sample of UK and 
European companies, the rank correlation between VA per employee and VA 
efficiency was r = 0.22; that between VA per employee and profitability was r = 
0.174; and that between VA per employee and VA share of sales was r = 0.043, 
none of which were significant. 
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Table 4 here 
 
Table 4 shows that for aerospace and defence companies, the European average 
for value added per employee was some 20% higher than the corresponding figure 
for the UK.  The high value added productivity companies comprised Dassault 
Aviation, EADS and SAAB; and the lowest value added productivity company 
was Bombardier (formerly Shorts, Belfast) whose productivity was 65% and 55% 
of the UK and European averages, respectively.  Comparing firms in similar 
markets, Dassault’s value added productivity was almost 90% higher than that for 
BAE Systems; EADS productivity was some 40% higher than Airbus UK; but 
Rolls-Royce productivity was some 15% higher than its French rival, Snecma. 
Dassault scores highly on all the criteria shown in Table 4: value added 
efficiency; a higher current value added efficiency than its four year average; a 
middle position on vertical integration; and a high profit margin.  However, the 
rankings are sensitive to the choice of performance indicator.  Using value added 
efficiency (wealth creation), its four year average and profit margins, the UK 
averages are slightly higher than those for Europe, with the UK also showing a 
higher degree of vertical integration.  A higher value added efficiency for the 
average of UK companies compared with the European average reflects their 
higher efficiency in creating wealth. 
 
(ii)  Output 
 Output is a major determinant of unit costs and hence competitiveness in the 
aerospace industry. Larger output allows the greater ‘spreading’ of fixed R&D 
costs and also results in learning economies which lead to rising productivity as 
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output increases.  A limited interview survey of UK firms (reported in Braddon 
and Hartley, 2002) found that learning remained important but it has been affected 
by modern manufacturing techniques, new materials and business practices.  The 
interviews suggested that whilst learning is still relevant, “the curve might now be 
steeper than it used to be”, that it has been affected by lean methods and supply 
chain changes and that “on the Joint Strike Fighter, BAE is comparable to 
Lockheed Martin.”  Three further comments were made on learning economies.  
First, that scale differences between the USA and the UK are not as important as 
they used to be.  Second, that UK labour costs are lower.  Third, that more capital-
intensive methods are now used since greater precision is needed for modern 
aircraft manufacture which results in fewer opportunities for labour learning.  
Overall, the consensus view was that UK aerospace unit cost curves were lower 
than US unit cost curves.   
 
There is also evidence of a major change in UK aerospace learning curves.  
Between the 1950s and 1970s, UK learning curves tended to ‘flatten-out’ at about 
100 units, reflecting the small-scale of UK aircraft output.  For example, on  eight 
UK civil aircraft projects, average output was 143 units ranging from 53 units 
((VC10) to 440 units (Viscount).  In contrast, US learning curves of that period 
showed continuous learning (eg. up to 5000 units on the Phantom combat 
aircraft).   On eight large US jet airliners, average output by end-1974 was 525 
units ranging from 100 units (Lockheed Tristar) to 1088 units (Boeing 727).  
Currently, for some projects, UK learning curves now show continuous learning 
reflecting a larger scale of output.        
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A distinction needs to be made between military and civil aircraft.  Industry 
performance on civil aircraft is probably a more accurate indicator of market 
competitiveness: civil aircraft markets are less subject to state protection and 
military projects are greatly affected by government procurement policies, 
including export licensing regimes.  On civil aircraft, the European Airbus is 
achieving US scales of output.  For example, on the Airbus A320 family, total 
output exceeded 2100 units by end-2003.  Here, it has to be remembered that 
Airbus was a new entrant to the large jet airliner market as recently as 1970, when 
the market was dominated by US companies, namely, Boeing, McDonnell 
Douglas and Lockheed.  In 2004, there is an industry duopoly comprising Airbus 
and Boeing.   
 
Airbus is distinctive in being an example of a competitive and hence successful 
European international collaborative organisation.  It provides a ‘model’ for other 
collaborative arrangements, especially for European military aerospace projects 
(cf.   Eurofighter Typhoon).  Using scale of output, market penetration and market 
share criteria, Airbus is a successful and competitive organisation (but the costs of 
achieving this market position would need to be included in any economic 
evaluation).  Airbus differs from other European collaborations in at least three 
ways. First, as a single company (now an integrated company), it represents a 
different form of collaboration (cf. European military aircraft collaborations 
which are project-specific with the partner companies retaining their identity).  
Second, Airbus is not constrained by the commitment to raise the technological 
capability of the partner nations (eg. as occurred on collaborative military aircraft 
projects).  Indeed, Airbus is less constrained by juste retour: in fact, it is claimed 
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that the juste retour used by Airbus has been beneficial in creating areas of 
technical expertise and specialisation (eg. BAE focus on wing technology for 
Airbus: ITC, 2001).  Third, to survive Airbus has to be competitive in responding 
to the varied and changing demands of the world civil aircraft market.  Unlike 
military collaborations, there is no guaranteed market for Airbus aircraft (cf. the 
partner nations on Eurofighter Typhoon which fund its R&D costs and provided 
firm production orders for the aircraft). 
 
On military aircraft, the US aerospace industry has the benefit of a large protected 
home market. The US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, now the Lockheed Martin F-35) 
illustrates the scale differences between the UK, other European nations and the 
USA.  The original planned requirement was 2852 JSF aircraft for the US Forces 
compared with a UK requirement for 150 aircraft.  Faced with such scale 
differences in military markets, the UK can respond by reducing unit costs 
compared with the USA; by exporting; and by international collaboration (eg. UK 
involvement in Eurofighter Typhoon and JSF).  On exports, the UK Hawk is a 
good example achieving both high output levels (over 800 aircraft) and a high 
proportion of output exported (almost 80% exported).   Similarly, Eurofighter 
shows how European collaboration results in output levels closer to those in the 
USA and considerably greater than European national scales of output.  For 
example, the partner nation’s planned order for Eurofighter is 620 units, 
comprising 232 units for the UK, 180 for Germany,  121 for Italy and 87 for 
Spain.  However, collaboration departs from the ‘ideal case’ leading to 
inefficiencies associated with complex international management and monitoring 
arrangements and restrictive work sharing requirements.  UK estimates suggest 
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that the total development costs on the four nation Eurofighter were almost twice 
as high as an alternative national aircraft; but typically, the UKs  cost share 
equates to one third of total development costs.  Similarly, the scale economies 
achieved on collaborative production programmes are in the region of half those 
on national programmes; and delays on collaborative programmes average almost 
one year (NAO, 2001).   
 
(iii)  Size of firms       
The US competitive advantage in the scale of output, especially for military 
aircraft, is also reflected in its advantage in firm size.  Large firms are able to 
obtain economies of scale and scope and in recent years there has been 
considerable merger activity creating larger aerospace firms.  US firms dominate 
the world’s top 10 aerospace firms, accounting for 7 out of the top 10 in 1996, 
2000 and 2002.  BAE Systems was the only UK aerospace company in the top 10 
in 1996, 2000 and 2002, ranking fourth in each year.  In contrast, the newly-
created EADS ranked third in 2000 and second in 2002 .   
 
Table 5 shows the top 15 aerospace companies between 1996 and 2002.  
Interestingly, 9 of the top 15 companies remain unchanged throughout the period 
(including BAE Systems and Thales/Thomson-CSF). Comparisons with Boeing 
for 2002 show the scale advantage of the US company: based on sales, EADS was 
53% and BAE was 34% of the size of Boeing.  Similarly, in aero-engines in 2002, 
Rolls-Royce was 55% of the size of General Electric. Within the top 15, between 
1996 and 2002, the UK and European firms have not achieved any substantial 
increase in their average size in relation to the top US firms.  This suggests that 
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the US aerospace mergers after 1996 have been more successful in creating 
relatively larger firms.  Also, over this period,  UK industry mergers have created 
relatively larger aerospace firms than in Europe.   
 
Table 5 here 
 
(iv)  Development time-scales 
The time taken to develop an aircraft from start to delivery is a further indicator of 
competitiveness.  Traditionally, the US aerospace industry developed both civil 
and military aircraft faster than the UK and European industries. For example, 
between 1945 and 1969, the average UK development times for military aircraft 
were 8 years 4 months compared with 6 years 3 months for the USA; and for civil 
aircraft, the average development times were 4 years and 4 months and 3 years 
and 7 months, respectively (Elstub, 1969).   
 
Since 1980, the position has changed.  On large jet airliners, Airbus is now 
competitive with Boeing on development times (where Airbus involves a UK 
component on the wings, engines and other equipment).  Table 6 shows 
development times for a similar group of Airbus and Boeing civil aircraft, with 
similarity defined by their characteristics.  Airbus aircraft were developed some 4-
7% faster, with Airbus being faster from start to first flight, but slightly slower 
from first flight to Certificate of Airworthiness. Interestingly, this evidence 
confirms that European collaboration in civil aircraft has created a competitive 
industrial organisation.  Regression analysis of various measures of development 
time against aircraft characteristics, a time-trend and a country of manufacture 
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dummy variable gave a significant and negative coefficient for the time-trend 
only.  As expected, the country of manufacture dummy was not significant.   
 
Table 6 here    
 
The traditional competitive advantage of the US industry in development times 
for military combat aircraft is shown in the following regression equation. This 
allows for combat aircraft characteristics: 
 
TCS = 143.71 – 0.12S + 2.32W* + 0.02R + 54.40CM + 0.39T 
   (1.97)   (1.99)     (2.69)      (1.26)        (2.36)      (0.26) 
              _ 
   R2  = 0.70 
 
where TCS = total time from contract start to service (months);  
S = speed; W = weight; R = range; CM = a dummy variable for USA = 0 and rest 
of world = 1; and T = a time-trend based on date of first flight.   
The equation was based on a sample of 11 US, European, Russian and Japanese 
modern combat aircraft (see also notes to Table 7). 
 
 
The equation shows a significant and predicted positive impact of weight on 
development times; but surprisingly, other aircraft characteristics, namely, speed 
and range were not significant.    The country of manufacture dummy is almost 
significant, showing a substantial US advantage in development times (some 4.5 
years).  
 
On current generations of combat aircraft, development times are similar between 
Europe and the USA, confirming that the US no longer has a competitive 
advantage in this aspect of industry performance.  On three current generation 
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European combat aircraft (Gripen; Rafale; Typhoon) average development times 
were 181 months compared with an average of 209 months for two US combat 
aircraft (F-22 and JSF, neither of which have yet entered service). Since the end of 
the Cold War, development times have been ‘stretched’ reflecting defence budget 
problems and less urgency due to a reduced threat.  Using pairwise comparisons, 
the European collaborative Typhoon has been developed in a considerably shorter 
time, namely, 214 months, than the US F-22 aircraft which is due in service in late 
2005 (231 months).  Admittedly, the US F-22 is a more complex, high-
performance aircraft which is more advanced than any of the current European 
combat aircraft.  Overall, the evidence shows that the traditional US competitive 
advantage on development times for civil and military combat aircraft no longer 
applies.    
 
v)  Labour hoarding   
The speed at which firms vary their labour force in response to changes in output 
is another indicator of their competitiveness.  A slow response suggests labour 
hoarding and labour retention policies.   Once again, the US ‘model’ is of an 
aerospace industry which adjusts its labour force quickly to variations in output.  
The statistical evidence suggests that since 1980, the UK aerospace industry’s 
employment has become more responsive to variations in output (cf Table 7: 
equations (2) and (3)).  Also, the UK industry’s employment responsiveness to 
changes in output is considerably higher than for the French aerospace industry 
and similar to that for the EU industry (Table 7: equations (1), (4) and (6)).  
Moreover, whilst the UK industry’s employment responsiveness remains below 
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that for the US aerospace industry, there was evidence of it approaching US 
levels.    
 
Table 7 here. 
 
Exports 
Exports and market shares are often used as major indicators of competitiveness.  
In 2000, civil and military exports accounted for 60% of the  UK aerospace 
industry’s turnover.  Civil aerospace sales  accounted for almost 55% of the UK 
industry’s turnover in 2000; and some two-thirds of this civil business was 
exported with civil aerospace exports accounting for 36% of total UK industry 
sales (SBAC, 2000).  On civil aircraft, the UK industry designs and manufactures 
the wings for Airbus; and UK firms are also suppliers of engines and equipment to 
Airbus, Boeing and to the regional aircraft manufacturers.  These exports reflect 
the fact that the UK is a world leader in wings, aero-engines and equipment some 
of which are represented on Airbus civil aircraft.  
 
Airbus was a new entrant to the large jet airliner industry with its first deliveries 
in 1974 to a market which had been dominated by US firms (Boeing; Lockheed; 
McDonnell Douglas in the early 1970s).  Since then Airbus has increased its share 
of the world market for large civil aircraft, achieving a 38% share in 2000 with the 
market changing from a US-dominated oligopoly to a  European-US duopoly.  
Table 8 shows the trends in Airbus penetration of the world market. Two points 
can be made about entry time and costs. First, it took Airbus 21 years to achieve a 
market share of over 30%.  Second, Airbus entry involved substantial costs for 
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European taxpayers, especially in France and Germany and particularly for the 
Airbus A300 and A310.  By  December 2003, Airbus had delivered 780 A300/310 
aircraft compared with 2109 units of the A320 family which is similar to Boeing 
scale of output for its successful airliners.        
 
Table 8 here. 
 
The military-civil sales ratio has changed substantially since 1980 when military 
sales accounted for about 65% of the UK aerospace industry’s sales and civil sales 
the remaining 35%.  In 2000, military sales accounted for 46% of the UK 
aerospace industry’s sales, shared equally between domestic and export customers 
(SBAC, 2001).   In comparison, the military-civil ratios of sales for the EU and 
the US aerospace industries were 30/70 and 40/60, respectively.   
 
Military aerospace exports dominated UK defence equipment exports  over the 
period 1980 to 2000, especially in the 1990s with sales to the Middle East.  
However, defence exports are determined by both economic and political factors 
which makes it difficult to assess competitiveness. Even standard competitiveness 
measures such as equipment prices are misleading, since they can reflect different 
national subsidies to producers, differences in national preferential  purchasing, 
various financial support arrangements (eg state export credits), offsets, a 
willingness by the supplying nation to waive R&D levies and the provision of 
gifts-in-kind (eg equipment and training free of charge).  Equipment prices can 
also be for the basic equipment or might include various amounts of spares, 
training and support services.  Political factors are also important, especially the 
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supplying nations views on the political and military importance of the buying 
country (eg. allies and friends; ethical criteria; willingness of rival nations to 
supply).  
 
Table 9 shows examples of the unit prices of various military aircraft. Amongst 
trainers, the UK Hawk appears to be competitive on price. This is confirmed by its 
status as a world leader for subsonic combat aircraft with 27% share of the world 
market compared with a 26% share for the USA over the period 1986 to 1997 
(based on volume data: DoS, 2000).  For both trainers and combat aircraft, some 
of the price data are for aircraft in the early stages of development whilst others 
are for aircraft in-service (eg.in-service aircraft at 2000 included Hawk, Gripen, F-
15, F-16,  Harrier and SU-27).  Amongst combat aircraft, the F-16, Gripen and 
SU-27 are relatively cheap, whilst the US F-15E and F-22 are costly aircraft, but 
technically advanced.   The collaborative Eurofighter Typhoon (with the UK as a 
partner) is cheaper than the US F-15 and F-22 but more expensive than Rafale. If 
the Lockheed Martin  JSF is  successful and its estimated costs are achieved 
(major assumptions), it will be a competitive aircraft and a major threat to 
Typhoon and Rafale.    
 
Table 9 here. 
 
Statistical analysis of the determinants of UK aerospace exports was constrained  
by the available data.  Some limited, exploratory equations were estimated and 
examples are shown in Table 10.  The time-trend variable gave the expected 
significant and positive coefficient for civil exports; but a surprising negative 
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coefficient for total exports.  The end of the Cold War resulted in a negative 
impact on total and military exports.  Passenger miles gave an expected positive 
impact on total exports, but a surprising negative coefficient for civil exports.  
There was no evidence of a ‘crowding-out’ effect from UK military equipment 
spending.  Military equipment imports were positively associated with total UK 
military exports, which might reflect the general level of demand in world 
military markets. 
 
Table 10 here. 
 
A relatively new feature of the UK aerospace industry is its global dimension with 
both inward and outward foreign direct investment.  The UK industry has 
considerable aerospace manufacturing assets overseas.  In 2000, these subsidiaries 
recorded sales of £5.55 billion and employed 47,000 personnel outside the UK.  
Some 60% of these overseas sales and employment were located in the USA ( UK 
firms with US subsidiaries included BAE, Rolls-Royce and Smiths), so allowing 
UK firms to achieve entry into the US market, especially its defence market.  
Similarly, some overseas companies have located in the UK or acquired UK 
aerospace companies (eg. Bombardier/Shorts; Agusta-Westland; TRW; Thales).  
As a result, the UK aerospace industry now comprises both UK and foreign-
owned companies located in the UK. 
Document converted by PDFMoto freeware version
Page 21 of 59
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
The competitiveness of the UK aerospace industry 
 22
Profitability 
In competitive markets, profitability can be regarded as the final indicator of 
industry performance and competitiveness.  Over the period 1985 to 2000, the UK 
aerospace industry achieved the highest median profit rate on sales, exceeding 
both the EU and the USA.  The UK industry’s annual profitability exceeded that 
of the EU in twelve of the sixteen years and exceeded that of the USA in ten of 
the sixteen years. The data are shown in Table 11. It is, however, recognised that 
national aerospace markets are imperfect: the EU and US markets are 
characterised by national monopolies and oligopolies, respectively, and both have  
national preferential purchasing policies (eg Buy America Act).  In principle, the 
UK market is different with its competitive procurement policy for military 
equipment, so that its profitability record is a more accurate reflection of 
international competitiveness.  Moreover, the UK industry’s profitability record 
was achieved despite the US industry’s advantage with its larger scale output and 
larger firms.   
 
Table 11 here 
 
Profitability data are also available at the company level and these are shown in 
Table 12, based on the year 2000.  There are two features of this Table.  First, the 
profitability of the two UK major aerospace firms, BAE and Rolls-Royce, 
generally exceeded that of their major  and much larger US rivals, namely, Boeing 
and Lockheed Martin.  Second, the profitability of some of the UK equipment 
suppliers exceeded that of the much larger UK and US companies (BAE; RR; 
Boeing; Lockheed Martin). 
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Conclusion 
The UK aerospace industry is the largest in the EU.  The USA is the UK 
industry’s major rival and provides the ‘benchmark’ for assessing its performance.  
On this basis and using the indicators reviewed in this paper, the UK industry 
improved its competitiveness over the period 1980 to 2000.  There were 
improvements in labour productivity, output levels, development times, 
employment responsiveness and export performance.  The results are summarised 
in Table 12. 
 
Table 12 here 
 
Statistical indicators confirm past and current performance and competitiveness 
but do not guarantee future successful competitiveness.  The main problems 
facing the UK aerospace industry arise from the lack of new R&D programmes to 
provide the next generation of projects.  Some of this new R&D will require 
government funding (IGT, 2003).  Technical change is also a challenge to the 
future UK aerospace firm.  The possible emergence of unmanned combat air 
vehicles (UCAVs) could revolutionise air warfare and lead to the end of manned 
combat aircraft and an increased emphasis on electronics and electronic warfare.  
For civil aircraft, the UK’s future looks to be through an involvement in 
collaborative Airbus programmes.  Also, the future absence of any UK-designed 
military and civil aircraft will mean the increasing importance of its equipment 
suppliers. 
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Benchmarking against the US aerospace industry and continued competition with 
its US rivals will provide a major competitive stimulus for the UK aerospace 
industry.  Evidence suggests that  “the more a given manufacturing industry is 
exposed to the world’s best practice high productivity industry, the higher its 
relative productivity (the closer it is to the leader).  Competition with the 
productivity leader encourages higher productivity” (Bailey and Solow, 2001).  
On this basis, part of an industry’s productivity disadvantage reflects 
organisational slack and/or reluctance to change and innovate.  Failure by the UK 
aerospace industry to adjust to change will mean more exits and the loss of its 
world leader companies.   
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Table 1.  UK Aerospace Industry, 1980-2002 
 
        1980       2000      2002 
Sales (£ billion, 
2002 prices) 
       12.90        18.85       16.14 
Employment         241,997         150,,651        117,256 
R&D share of sales 
(%) 
          Na          10.0         10.8 
Exports as share of 
sales (%) 
         47           60          63 
Civil share of sales 
(%) 
         36            54           55 
Military share of 
sales (%) 
         64            46           45 
 
Note:  Sales are unconsolidated sales which is the sum of each company’s total 
aerospace turnover. 
 
Source: SBAC (2002) 
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Table 2.  The World’s Aerospace Industries       
 
 Sales 
2000 
(Euro 
billion, 
current 
prices) 
Sales 
2002 
(Euro 
billion, 
current 
prices) 
Employment 
      2000 
      (000) 
Employment 
      2002 
      (000) 
USA 105.6 102.7       595.9       531.9 
EU   72.3   74.6       429.1       407.8  
Japan   13.4   11.4         33.0         31.0 
Canada   13.6   14.5         91.5         78.8  
Others     9.4     9.0         70.0       103.0 
Total 214.2 212.2      1219.5     1152.5  
 
 Notes: 
(i)  USA and EU turnover is for consolidated turnover. For the EU, 
consolidated turnover represents all sales to end-user customers and to 
aerospace firms outside the EU.  Employment figures at year end and are 
based on direct employment.  EU figures include the UK. 
  
 (ii)  Others is an estimate excluding China and CIS 
 
 Source:  AECMA (2000; 2002) 
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Table 3  Labour Productivity (Aerospace), 1980 - 2000  
 
           UK            EU         USA 
1980 Index 
(US = 100) 
           77            99          100 
2000 
Sales per employee 
Index (US=100) 
 
 
     £96,183 
          (89) 
 
 
     £102,698 
           (95) 
 
 
     £108,012 
          (100) 
 
Note:  All sales figures are consolidated sales.  US figures are based on AECMA 
estimates. 
Source:  AECMA (2002) 
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Table 4.  Value added Productivity: UK and European Companies, 2004 
 
Company Value 
added per 
employee 
  (£000) 
Value 
added 
efficiency 
     (%) 
Value 
added 
efficiency: 
4 year 
average 
     (%) 
Value 
added 
share of 
sales 
   (%) 
Operating 
profit as 
share of 
sales 
    (%) 
All UK 
Companies 
     44.7      143.4      149     30.1      4.4 
All UK Aerospace 
and Defence  
      45.0       118.1        125     39.9      2.5 
BAE Systems       45.7       105.4            119     39.3       na 
Rolls-Royce        51.4       115.9       121     34.8      3.4 
Smiths        47.4       139.8       143      48.7     12.4 
Airbus        49.1       120.9        na      26.5       4.6 
Cobham        47.5             147.6        146      51.2     14.7 
Bombardier        29.6       113.5        124      48.8       1.8 
Meggitt        54.5       134.9        147      50.2        8.4      
Dunlop Standard 
Aerospace 
       50.1       152.9        163      43.9      14.5 
Ultra Electronics        49.1        140.8         141       45.2       11.4  
EUROPE: 
All European 
Aerospace and 
Defence 
companies 
        54.1        116.2          120        38.1        2.3 
EADS        67.7        112.4             109        33.4        0.3 
Thales (F)        51.0        110.9         112        39.5        2.1 
Finnmeccanica(It)        47.5          123.6         128        40.1        5.8 
Snecma (F)        45.2         116.2         129        39.4        4.0 
Dassault Aviation 
(F) 
       85.2         155.7         147        43.1       14.6 
SAAB (Sweden)       54.9          117.5          121         57.5         7.0 
 
Notes: 
 
(i)  Value added (VA) efficiency is VA divided by labour costs and depreciation.  The 
DTI Scoreboard refers to this measure as wealth creation. 
(ii)  VA efficiency 4 year average shows that a company is becoming more efficient if 
its current VA efficiency is higher than its 4 year average. 
(iii)  A high VA sales ratio shows a high degree of vertical integration.   
(iv)  The UK sample is based on the top 800 UK companies; and the European sample 
is based on the top 600 European companies, including UK companies. 
 
Source:  DTI (2004) 
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Table 5. Top 15 Aerospace Firms 
 
                    2002                    2000                    1996 
Firm 
Ranking 
Aerospace 
Sales 
($m) 
Firm 
Ranking 
Aerospace 
Sales 
($m) 
Firm 
Ranking 
Aerospace 
Sales 
($m) 
Boeing 53,344  Boeing 51,407 Lockheed 
Martin 
26,068 
EADS (E) 28,182 Lockheed 
Martin 
23,977 Boeing 22,681 
Lockheed 
Martin 
26,562  EADS 23,336 McDonnell 
Douglas 
13,447 
 BAE 
Systems 
18,236  BAE 
Systems 
19,661  British 
Aerospace 
11,635 
 Northrop 
Grumman 
18,126 Raytheon 15,443 Aerospatiale 
(F) 
9,948 
Raytheon 17,449 United 
Technologies 
12,358 United 
Technologies 
8,852 
United 
Technologies 
13,216 General 
Electric 
10,779 DASA (G) 8,636 
General 
Electric 
11,141 Honeywell 9,988 Hughes 
Electronics 
8,314 
Honeywell 
International 
8,855 Northrop 
Grumman 
7,782 Northrop 
Grumman 
8,071 
Thales (F) 8,035 Bombardier  7,112 Raytheon  7,769 
Bombardier 
( C ) 
7,194 Rolls-Royce 6,890 General 
Electric 
6,302 
General  
Dynamics 
6,970 TRW 6,237 Thomson-
CSF (F) 
6,264 
Rolls-Royce  6,179 Thales 5,977 Allied Signal 5,714 
Snecma (F) 6,130 Snecma 5,204 GEC (UK) 5,653 
Finmeccanica 
(Italy) 
5,041 Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries (J) 
4,841 Rolls-Royce 4,616 
Average size: 
UK v USA 
 
      63% 
 
      
 
   77% 
  
     61% 
Average size:  
Europe v 
USA 
 
       61% 
        
  
    67% 
  
      70% 
Average size: 
EU v UK 
   
        97% 
  
     87% 
      
       113%  
 
Notes: i) Sales figures are in current prices and are for aerospace sales only.  Most 
companies have other sales, but total sales figures are not reported here. 
ii) C = Canada; E = Europe; F = France; G = Germany. 
iii)  Average size of firm is based on firms in the top 15.   
 
Sources: Flight (1997; 2002; 2003) 
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Table 6.  Average Development Times for Civil Aircraft 
 
Development Times 
(months) 
  Aircraft Characteristics  
Aircraft 
Start to 
first 
flight 
First 
flight 
to CoA 
Total 
Time 
Speed 
(mph) 
Weight 
   (lbs) 
Passengers 
 
Range 
(miles) 
Airbus 
(n=7) 
 
   43.4 
 
   13 
 
   56.4 
 
  595 
    
325,179   
 
       252 
 
4653 
Airbus  
(n=6) 
 
   43.8 
 
    11 
 
    54.8 
 
   602 
 
318,748 
 
       250 
 
 4716 
Boeing 
(n=7) 
 
   48.9 
 
    9.9  
 
    58.7 
 
   606 
 
388,078 
 
        240 
 
  4516 
 
Notes: 
i.  Airbus n=7 sample: A300;A310; A320; A319; A321; A340; A330.  The sample 
n=6 excluded the A300 with a first flight in 1972.  All other Airbus airliners had a 
first flight date of 1982-95. 
ii.  Boeing n=7 sample: B737 Next Generation; B747-400; B757; B767; BMD11; 
B717-200, all with first flight dates of 1981-98.   
iii.  Weight is maximum take-off weight; months are rounded to nearest month; CoA 
is award of Certificate of Airworthiness.   
 
Source: Janes (2001)    
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Table 7.  Employment Equations      
 
Coefficients of: Dependent 
variable 
 
Constant Log 
Q 
  t Log 
Lt-1 
 
,1 
 
,11 
 
8 
  _ 
  R2 
 
 d 
1)  LogLt 
     (UK) 
3.59* 
(2.35) 
0.38** 
(5.02) 
-0.04** 
(4.74) 
0.42** 
(3.45) 
0.38 0.65 0.58 0.980 2.1 
2) LogLt 
     (UK) 
0.87 
(1.97) 
0.35** 
(5.64) 
-0.02** 
(6.62) 
0.69* 
(15.12) 
0.35 1.14 0.31 0.968 1.3 
3)  LogLt 
      (UK) 
-2.65 
 (1.21) 
0.65** 
(4.26) 
-0.02* 
(2.75) 
0.69** 
(5.35) 
0.65 2.1 0.31 0.961 1.7 
4)  LogLt 
     (EU) 
3.90** 
(4.55) 
0.41** 
(5.28) 
-0.02** 
(3.34) 
0.39** 
(4.00) 
0.41 0.67 0.61 0.988 2.1 
5)  LogLt 
     (USA) 
2.80** 
(3.88) 
0.42** 
(5.19) 
-0.003 
(1.14) 
0.46** 
(8.17) 
0.42 0.77 0.54 0.985 2.4 
6)  LogLt 
      (FR) 
4.21** 
(3.91) 
0.16* 
(2.35) 
-0.01* 
(2.34) 
0.51** 
(5.26) 
0.16 0.33 0.49 0.96 2.0 
 
Notes: 
 
i)  All equations are log linear: logLt = log a + bt + c logQ + d log Lt-1 where  ,1= c; 
,11= c/ 8; d = 1 - 8 where 8 = lagged adjustment of actual to desired employment.  
 
ii)  Lt = employment; t = an exponential time trend representing technology and the 
capital stock; Q = value of turnover in constant 1999 prices (US $  millions); Lt-1 = 
lagged dependent variable. 
 
iii)  Equations (1) and (3)  included a dummy variable for end of Cold War (not 
significant); equation  (4) included a dummy for end of Cold War in 1991 
(significant); equation (5)  included slope shift dummies for mergers and dummies for 
end of Cold War (none were significant); equation (6) also included a dummy for end 
of the Cold War (not significant). 
 
iv) Equations (1), (3), (5) and (6)  based on 1980–2000; equation (2) based on 1948-
2000; equation (4) based on 1980-1999. Equations (1), (4) and (6) use consolidated 
turnover; equations (2) and (3) use unconsolidated turnover.  
                   
v)  t-ratios in brackets; R2  is adjusted for degrees of freedom; d = Durbin Watson 
statistic; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.   
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Table 8.  Airbus and Boeing Sales, 1974 - 2000       
 
Gross 
deliveries 
(units) 
1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Airbus         5      38       42        95      124      311 
Boeing 
(incldg 
McDonnell 
Douglas) 
  
    284 
     
   363 
 
    282 
 
     527 
 
      261 
 
     504 
Airbus 
share 
(%) 
 
      1.7   
 
    9.5 
 
      13.0 
 
    15.3 
 
     32.2 
 
   38.2 
 
Source: DTI (2002). 
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Table 9.  Military Aircraft Unit Prices      
 
                       Aircraft                  Unit Price 
                 (US$ millions)              
Trainers  
Hawk (UK)                  18-21 
MAKO (EADS)                  22-25 
KTX-2 (S. Korea)                  18-20  
Combat Aircraft       
Eurofighter  Typhhon                  68 
Rafale (France)                  58 
Gripen (Sweden)                  35 
F-15E (USA)                  75  
F-16 (USA)                   24-25 
F-18 E/F (USA)                   50 
F-22 (USA)                  183 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF:USA)                    31-38 (different versions) 
Harrier AV8B (UK-US)                    36  
Mitsubishi F-2 (Japan)                   115  
SU-27 (Russia)                     35 
 
Sources:  Variuos aviation and defence magazines (eg Defense News; Aviation 
Week; Janes Defence Weekly; Flight; Fug Revue; Air Forces Monthly).  All data are 
for 1999, 2000 or 2001. 
 
Document converted by PDFMoto freeware version
Page 34 of 59
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 
Table 10.  UK Aerospace Exports. 
 
                 Coefficients of: Dependent 
Variable 
Constant 
     t Cold 
War 
Dummy 
PASM DSP MIMP 
_ 
R2 
 
  d 
1) TEXP  -6.95 
(1.89) 
-0.64** 
(3.36) 
-1.66* 
(2.72) 
0.02** 
(5.45) 
0.0002 
(0.55) 
0.20 
(0.11) 
0.93 2.1 
2)  TMX 4518.4 
(1.78) 
67.09 
(0.66) 
-1661.6* 
(2.48) 
 -0.23 
(1.21) 
2.53* 
(2.14) 
0.79 1.7 
3)  TCX 8417.7* 
(2.28) 
711.55** 
(3.54) 
-207.5 
(0.32) 
-16.33** 
(4.69) 
-0.12 
(0.73) 
 0.85 1.9 
Notes: 
i) TEXP = total UK aerospace exports; TMX = total UK military aerospace exports; 
TCX = total UK civil aerospace exports.  All value data in £ billions, 1999 prices. 
Equations (1) and (2) are based on 1980-1998; equation (3) based on 1980-2000. All 
equations are linear. 
 
ii) t = time-trend; dummy variable (1,0) for the end of the Cold War was based on 
either 1991 or 1992; PASM = world passenger miles (billions); DSP = UK military 
equipment spending; MIMP = UK military equipment imports lagged one year.   
 
iii)  Other details as in Table 7.   
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Table 11.  Industry Profitability  [Profit as percentage of sales (%)] 
 
                           Aerospace Industry   
      Year 
 
 
 
            UK 
 
         EU 
 
        USA 
1985              5.5            5.2          3.1 
1986              5.0             4.2          2.8  
1987              4.4           3.5           4.1  
1988              3.4           3.8           4.3 
1989              4.2           3.2            3.3   
1990              2.8           2.4          3.4 
1991              2.2           2.4          1.8 
1992             -1.2          -0.6         -1.4 
1993              2.2            0.7          3.6 
1994              0.5                   0.0          4.7 
1995              5.4           0.0           3.8 
1996              4.8           2.2          5.6  
1997              6.2           3.9          5.2 
1998              6.9           6.7          5.0  
1999              6.4           6.8          6.5 
2000              6.4           4.9          4.7 
Median              4.6           3.4          4.0 
 
Sources: AECMA; SBAC; USAIA 
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Table 12.  Competitiveness Indicators, 1980-2000   
 
Indicator  UK industry performance relative to 
USA 
1.  Labour productivity  Improving 
2.  Output (a) Civil 
                  (b)  Military 
Airbus achieving US scales of output 
UK/JSF = US scales of output 
Eurofighter = higher output 
3.  Development times US no longer has competitive advantage 
4.  Labour hoarding UK employment responsiveness has 
improved and is approaching US  
levels. 
5.  Exports a. Military aerospace exports dominated 
UK defence exports; 
b.  World leader for subsonic combat 
aircraft; 
c. Airbus: rising share of world market   
6.  Industry profitability Higher than USA 
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Abstract 
 
Porter’s five competitive forces model provides an analytical framework for assessing 
the UK aerospace industry’s competitiveness in this paper.  Various statistical 
indicators are used to measure competitiveness, based on published data at the industry 
and firm level, supplemented with information from company interviews.  The 
indicators include productivity, output, firm size, development time-scales, labour 
hoarding, exports and profitability.  The empirical results of this paper suggest that, 
over the period 1980-2000, the UK aerospace industry improved its competitiveness 
compared with the USA and the EU.   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The UK aerospace industry is often regarded as one of “Britain’s last remaining world 
class, high technology  manufacturing industries” (SBAC, 2000, p3; IGT, 2003; TIC, 
2005).  This paper assesses the international competitiveness of the industry. 
Competitiveness is determined by, and reflected in, price-cost factors and non-price 
factors.  Price-cost factors reflect industry and company efficiency (eg. factor 
productivity; lean manufacturing), the opportunities for achieving economies of scale, 
scope and learning and the extent of rivalry.  Non-price factors include research and 
development (R&D), development time-scales, delivery schedules, export finance, 
reliability and the provision of spares and support over the life-cycle (for further 
discussion on the meaurement of international competitiveness, see Manzur et al, 
1999 and Kambhampati U.S., 2000).  A related  taxonomy is that competitiveness is 
embodied in five competitive forces comprising threats from new entrants and 
substitute products and services, the bargaining power of buyers and suppliers and 
rivalry amongst existing competitors.  These five competitive forces are a function of 
industry structure and determine long-run industry profitability (Porter, 1990, p35).   
 
The five competitive forces provide an analytical framework for assessing the UK 
aerospace industry’s competitiveness.  Various statistical indicators are used to 
measure competitiveness, based on published data at the industry and firm level.  The 
indicators include productivity, output, firm size, development time-scales, labour 
hoarding, exports and profitability. 
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 2
The UK aerospace industry 
 
The UK aerospace industry comprises firms involved in the design, development, 
manufacture and support of aircraft, helicopters, missiles and space systems (eg. 
satellites).  It includes aircraft and systems, engines, equipment and maintenance, 
repair and overhaul companies supplying military and civil markets in both the UK 
and overseas.   
 
Government is central to understanding aerospace and similar industries in the UK 
and elsewhere (see, for example, Bonte, 2003).  Governments are major buyers of 
aerospace equipment for their armed forces and they can use their buying power to 
influence the size, structure, conduct and performance of their national industries.  
Government also influences the civil aircraft market through its allocation of national 
landing and over-flying rights, its provision of financial support for civil aircraft 
development programmes and exports, and its ownership and support for national 
airlines.  In the UK, both the aerospace industry and its airlines are privately-owned.    
 
Table 1 shows some of the UK aerospace industry’s stylised facts.  Over the period 
1980-2002, real sales and export shares increased whilst employment declined 
substantially.   Also, the relative contributions of military and civil markets changed 
markedly, reflecting the disarmament following end of the Cold War.  The R&D-
intensity of the industry is reflected in some 10% of sales devoted to R&D.  Even 
these simple descriptive statistics showing rising trends in export shares and a high 
proportion of output exported suggest that this is a competitive industry. This position 
is reinforced by the fact that in 2002, about two-thirds of UK civil aerospace sales 
were exported.   
 
  Table 1.  UK Aerospace Industry, 1980-2002 
 
        1980       2000      2002 
Sales (£ billion, 
2002 prices) 
       12.90        18.85       16.14 
Employment         241997         150651        117256 
R&D share of sales 
(%) 
          Na          10.0         10.8 
Exports as share of 
sales (%) 
         47           60          63 
Civil share of sales 
(%) 
         36            54           55 
Military share of 
sales (%) 
         64            46           45 
 
Note:  Sales are unconsolidated sales which is the sum of each company’s total 
aerospace turnover. 
 
Source: SBAC (2002) 
 
The UK aerospace industry is highly imperfect comprising domestic monopolies in 
military and civil aircraft (BAE Systems), helicopters (AgustaWestland), and engines 
(Rolls-Royce), a duopoly in missiles (MBDA; Thales: Racal and Shorts Missile 
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Systems) and oligopoly in the equipment sector (BAE Avionics; Thales; Smiths; 
Cobham).  The major UK aerospace firms are also partners in European collaborative 
programmes (see Bishop, 2003).  BAE is involved in Eurofighter Typhoon (UK; 
Germany; Italy; Spain), Airbus (wings representing 20% of the Airbus company) and 
missiles (MBDA); AgustaWestland in joint European helicopter programmes and 
Rolls-Royce is a partner in associated European collaborative engine projects.  BAE 
dominates the UK aerospace industry, accounting for some 75% of the industry’s 
sales in 2002.  BAE also dominates the UK defence market with its involvement as a 
major supplier of air, land and sea systems as well as defence electronics.   
 
The UK aerospace industry has considerable development and manufacturing assets 
overseas, especially in the USA. For example, BAE owns US avionics firms and 
Rolls-Royce owns the US Allison engine company.  In 2002, total employment in the 
USA of UK aerospace industry assets was almost 26,000 personnel.  Similarly, many 
overseas companies have either located in the UK or purchased UK aerospace 
companies (eg. Goodrich; Thales).    
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the UK, European and US aerospace industries have 
experienced substantial consolidation (for a discussion of the welfare effects of 
increased industrial concentration in manufacturing industries, see Gopinath et al, 
2004).  In the UK, major mergers and take-overs led to the creation of BAE Systems 
(British Aerospace and GEC Marconi Electronics), AgustaWestland (helicopters: a 
merger between Agusta/Italy and Westland/UK, with the UK interest sold to 
Finmeccanica in 2004) and the Thales acquisition of Racal and Shorts Missile 
Systems.  In Europe, EADS represented a merger of Aerospatiale Matra (France), 
Daimler Chrysler (Germany) and CASA (Spain).  US mergers and take-overs resulted 
in a smaller number of major aerospace companies, forming a major competitive 
threat to UK and European firms.  Boeing acquired Rockwell and McDonnell 
Douglas; Lockheed Martin acquired General Dynamics Aircraft, a merger of 
Lockheed and Martin Marietta and the acquisition of Loral; Northrop acquired LTV 
Aircraft, then merged with Grumman followed by the acquisitions of Litton and 
Newport News Shipbuilding; and Raytheon acquired Beech Aircraft, BAe Business 
Jet, TI Defence and Hughes Aerospace and Defence.   
 
A comparative assessment   
 
The UK aerospace industry’s position in the world market can be assessed by 
comparing it with the USA, the EU and other rivals. The US aerospace industry 
dominates the world market. In 2000/02 and on the basis of sales and employment, 
the US industry was some four times larger than the UK industry; and if size indicates 
the opportunities for achieving economies of scale, learning and scope, then the US 
industry has a competitive advantage over the rest of the world.  Outside the EU, 
other major rivals include Canada and Japan (Table 2).  Within the EU, the UK 
aerospace industry is the largest employer followed by France, Germany and Italy.     
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Table 2.  The World’s Aerospace Industries       
 
 Sales 
2000 
(Euro 
billion, 
current 
prices) 
Sales 
2002 
(Euro 
billion, 
current 
prices) 
Employment 
      2000 
      (000) 
Employment 
      2002 
      (000) 
USA 105.6 102.7       595.9       531.9 
EU   72.3   74.6       429.1       407.8  
Japan   13.4   11.4         33.0         31.0 
Canada   13.6   14.5         91.5         78.8  
Others     9.4     9.0         70.0       103.0 
Total 214.2 212.2      1219.5     1152.5  
 
 Notes: 
(i)  USA and EU turnover is for consolidated turnover. For the EU, 
consolidated turnover represents all sales to end-user customers and to 
aerospace firms outside the EU.  Employment figures at year end and are 
based on direct employment.  EU figures include the UK. 
  
 (ii)  Others is an estimate excluding China and CIS 
 
 Source:  AECMA (2000; 2002) 
 
The five competitive forces 
 
Assessing the industry using Porter’s five competitive forces requires a distinction 
between military and civil aerospace markets.  In the UK military market, the 
Government is a major buyer and funder of development programmes and can use its 
buying power to regulate profits.  Government also determines entry and exit and 
typically UK defence contracts are subject to competitive procurement allowing 
foreign firms to bid for such contracts.  Usually, there is significant rivalry between 
existing foreign competitors, mainly European (EADS; Dassault; Saab) and US firms 
(Boeing; Lockheed Martin; Northrop Grumman; Raytheon).  Oligopoly in the world 
market results in close substitutes with rivalry in combat aircraft and military 
helicopters.  However, the threat of new entry is limited, mainly because of high entry 
barriers and costs due to the need for costly and fixed R&D expenditure which on 
defence work is usually borne by government.  Also, further entry barriers arise from 
economies of scale and learning.  Nonetheless, large defence electronics companies 
provide an entry threat.  Substitutes for an effective combat aircraft take many years 
to develop (eg.  10+ years) and whilst buyers are budget-constrained, they are not 
generally price-sensitive.  Rivalry tends to be based on non-price factors, especially 
R&D which determines the technical features of military aircraft (eg. speed; range; 
weapons capability).   
 
Civil markets are different, especially on the demand side, where governments are not 
major buyers.  UK airlines form a privately-owned oligopsony, dominated by British 
Airways. Within the world market, there are large numbers of state-and privately-
owned airlines demanding large and regional jet airliners.  There are also large 
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numbers of buyers for business jets and for light aircraft for pleasure use.  On the 
supply side within the world market, there are  duopolies in large jet airliners (Airbus, 
Europe; Boeing, USA)  and regional jet airliners (Bombardier, Canada; Embraer, 
Brazil).  The large jet airliner industry is characterised by high entry barriers, 
reflecting high R&D costs and scale and learning economies (Graham, 2001).  
However, duopoly results in close substitutes for both regional and large civil aircraft. 
Nonetheless, substitutes for a commercially-successful large jet airliner might take 
some 6 years to develop with break-even occurring some 10-15 years into production 
and pay-back periods extending a further 20 years or more. Even on regional jet 
airliners, orders for 40-60 aircraft are the minimum required for a commercial launch.  
These unique economic characteristics of civil aircraft development mean that this is 
not a market offering short-term profitability.   
 
Duopoly prime contractors can use their buying power on major new programmes to 
obtain favourable deals with their major suppliers, especially the engine companies.  
The world aero-engine market is an oligopoly comprising Pratt and Whitney (United 
Technologies, USA; General Electric, USA; Rolls-Royce, UK; and Snecma, France).  
These companies compete vigorously for their engines to be used on new civil aircraft 
programmes (eg. Airbus 380; Boeing 7E7).  There is similar rivalry between a small 
number of major equipment companies for a share of such new projects.    
 
Both the large and regional jet airliner industry has been characterised by exits.  In 
2003, the UK as a prime contractor, exited from the regional jet airliner market 
(similar exits occurred for Fokker, Netherlands and Fairchild Dornier, Germany).  
However, a number of nations are seeking to enter the regional airliner industry  (eg. 
China; Indonesia; Spain).  For both existing and new entrants, Government is  
involved in the civil aircraft market through the provision of state financial support 
for new aircraft programmes.  The UK Government provides a risk sharing, repayable 
investment in the form of launch investment  with repayments through a levy on sales.  
Studies of international financial supports show that “there is a very large imbalance 
in the absolute levels of support provided by other governments to their civil 
aerospace industries, particularly the USA, and a material imbalance with the rest of 
Europe”(IGT, 2003).  Estimates show that the US support may be at least seven times 
and possibly as high as twelve times greater than the level of support available in 
Europe.  Despite the lower levels of state support available, the UK industry has 
achieved significant success in creating world-class competitors.  However, nations 
are in a prisoner’s dilemma subsidy war which extends to include local and regional 
government (eg. with regions in various nations offering competitive subsidies to 
attract aerospace firms, especially suppliers).        
 
In the Porter model, industries in which the pressure from one or more of the five 
competitive forces is intense are ones where few firms are very profitable for long 
periods (Porter, 1990, p35).  The UK aerospace industry has at least three intense 
competitive forces, namely, powerful buyers in both military (government) and civil 
markets (prime contractors), fierce competitive rivalry and substitute products: hence 
the prediction that UK aerospace will have few firms which are very profitable for 
long periods. The remainder of this paper assesses the UK aerospace industry 
competitiveness using various statistical indicators mostly for the period 1980 to 
2000. Inevitably, there is no single ‘best’ indicator of performance, so that a balanced 
assessment requires several performance measures. 
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Assessing the Competitiveness of the UK Aerospace Industry  
 
(i)  Labour productivity 
 
Productivity is one of the determinants of competitiveness.  This section focuses on 
industry labour productivity based on sales per employee, since this is the measure for 
which international data are readily available.  The UK aerospace industry’s labour 
productivity relative to the USA and the EU improved over the period 1980 to 2000.  
The 1980 productivity gap between the UK on the one hand and the EU and USA 
industries on the other was reduced substantially by 2000 (Table 3). 
 
 Table 3  Labour Productivity, 1980 - 2000  
 
           UK            EU         USA 
1980 Index 
(US = 100) 
           77            99          100 
2000 
Sales per employee 
Index (US=100) 
 
 
     £96183 
          (89) 
 
 
     £102698 
           (95) 
 
 
     £108012 
          (100) 
 
Note:  All sales figures are consolidated sales.  US figures are based on AECMA 
estimates. 
Source:  AECMA (2002) 
 
 
The DTI publishes an annual Value Added Scoreboard which provides data for a 
sample of UK and European companies (first published in 2002).  These show value 
added productivity defined as value added per employee and value adding  efficiency 
or wealth creation which is value added divided by input costs of labour and 
equipment depreciation.  For the combined sample of UK and European aerospace  
companies, the rank correlation between VA per employee and VA efficiency was r = 
0.22; that between VA per employee and profitability was r = 0.174; and that between 
VA per employee and VA share of sales was r = 0.043, none of which were 
significant. 
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Table 4.  Value added Productivity: UK and European Companies, 2004 
 
Company Value 
added per 
employee 
  (£000) 
Value 
added 
efficiency 
     (%) 
Value 
added 
efficiency: 
4 year 
average 
     (%) 
Value 
added 
share of 
sales 
   (%) 
Operating 
profit as 
share of 
sales 
    (%) 
All UK 
Companies 
     44.7      143.4      149     30.1      4.4 
All UK Aerospace 
and Defence  
      45.0       118.1        125     39.9      2.5 
BAE Systems       45.7       105.4            119     39.3       Na 
Rolls-Royce        51.4       115.9       121     34.8      3.4 
Smiths        47.4       139.8       143      48.7     12.4 
Airbus        49.1       120.9        na      26.5       4.6 
Cobham        47.5             147.6        146      51.2     14.7 
Bombardier        29.6       113.5        124      48.8       1.8 
Meggitt        54.5       134.9        147      50.2        8.4      
Dunlop Standard 
Aerospace 
       50.1       152.9        163      43.9      14.5 
Ultra Electronics        49.1        140.8         141       45.2       11.4  
EUROPE: 
All European 
Aerospace and 
Defence 
companies 
        54.1        116.2          120        38.1        2.3 
EADS        67.7        112.4             109        33.4        0.3 
Thales (F)        51.0        110.9         112        39.5        2.1 
Finnmeccanica(It)        47.5          123.6         128        40.1        5.8 
Snecma (F)        45.2         116.2         129        39.4        4.0 
Dassault Aviation 
(F) 
       85.2         155.7         147        43.1       14.6 
SAAB (Sweden)       54.9          117.5          121         57.5         7.0 
Notes: 
(i)  Value added (VA) efficiency is VA divided by labour costs and depreciation.  The 
DTI Scoreboard refers to this measure as wealth creation. 
(ii)  VA efficiency 4 year average shows that a company is becoming more efficient if 
its current VA efficiency is higher than its 4 year average. 
(iii)  A high VA sales ratio shows a high degree of vertical integration.   
(iv)  The UK sample is based on the top 800 UK companies; and the European sample 
is based on the top 600 European companies, including UK companies. 
 
Source:  DTI (2004) 
 
Table 4 shows that for aerospace and defence companies, the European average for 
value added per employee was some 20% higher than the corresponding figure for the 
UK.  The high value added productivity companies comprised Dassault Aviation, 
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EADS and SAAB; and the lowest value added productivity company was Bombardier 
(formerly Shorts, Belfast) whose productivity was 65% and 55% of the UK and 
European averages, respectively.  Comparing firms in similar markets, Dassault’s 
value added productivity was almost 90% higher than that for BAE Systems; EADS 
productivity was some 40% higher than Airbus UK; but Rolls-Royce productivity was 
some 15% higher than its French rival, Snecma. Dassault scores highly on all the 
criteria shown in Table 4: value added efficiency; a higher current value added 
efficiency than its four year average; a middle position on vertical integration; and a 
high profit margin.  However, the rankings are sensitive to the choice of performance 
indicator.  Using value added efficiency (wealth creation), its four year average and 
profit margins, the UK averages are slightly higher than those for Europe, with the 
UK also showing a higher degree of vertical integration.  A higher value added 
efficiency for the average of UK companies compared with the European average 
reflects their higher efficiency in creating wealth.     
 
(ii)  Output 
  
Output is a major determinant of unit costs and hence competitiveness in the 
aerospace industry. Larger output allows the greater ‘spreading’ of fixed R&D costs 
and also results in learning economies which lead to rising productivity as output 
increases (see Frantzen D, 1998).  A limited interview survey of UK firms 
(undertaken in 2001/02) found that learning remained important but it has been 
affected by modern manufacturing techniques, new materials and business practices.  
The interviews suggested that whilst learning is still relevant, “the curve might now 
be steeper than it used to be,” that it has been affected by lean methods and supply 
chain changes and that “on the Joint Strike Fighter, BAE is comparable to Lockheed 
Martin.” (Braddon and Hartley, 2002).  Three further comments were made on 
learning economies.  First, that scale differences between the USA and the UK are not 
as important as they used to be.  Second, that UK labour costs are lower.  Third, that 
more capital-intensive methods are now used since greater precision is needed for 
modern aircraft manufacture which results in fewer opportunities for labour learning.  
Overall, the consensus view was that UK aerospace unit cost curves were lower than 
US unit cost curves.   
 
There is also evidence of a major change in UK aerospace learning curves.  Between 
the 1950s and 1970s, UK learning curves tended to ‘flatten-out’ at about 100 units, 
reflecting the small-scale of UK aircraft output.  For example, on  eight UK civil 
aircraft projects, average output was 143 units ranging from 53 units ((VC10) to 440 
units (Viscount).  In contrast, US learning curves of that period showed continuous 
learning (eg. up to 5000 units on the Phantom combat aircraft).   On eight large US jet 
airliners, average output by end-1974 was 525 units ranging from 100 units 
(Lockheed Tristar) to 1088 units (Boeing 727).  Currently, for some projects, UK 
learning curves now show continuous learning reflecting a larger scale of output (for a 
wider discussion of learning curves in a related industry, see Chung, 2001).        
 
A distinction needs to be made between military and civil aircraft.  Industry 
performance on civil aircraft is probably a more accurate indicator of market 
competitiveness: civil aircraft markets are less subject to state protection and military 
projects are greatly affected by government procurement policies, including export 
licensing regimes.  On civil aircraft, the European Airbus is achieving US scales of 
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output.  For example, on the Airbus A320 family, total output exceeded 2100 units by 
end-2003.  Here, it has to be remembered that Airbus was a new entrant to the large 
jet airliner market as recently as 1970, when the market was dominated by US 
companies, namely, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed.  In 2004, there is an 
industry duopoly comprising Airbus and Boeing.   
 
Airbus is distinctive in being an example of a competitive and hence successful 
European international collaborative organisation.  It provides a ‘model’ for other 
collaborative arrangements, especially for European military aerospace projects (cf.   
Eurofighter Typhoon).  Using scale of output, market penetration and market share 
criteria, Airbus is a successful and competitive organisation (but the costs of 
achieving this market position would need to be included in any economic 
evaluation).  Airbus differs from other European collaborations in at least three ways. 
First, as a single company (now an integrated company), it represents a different form 
of collaboration (cf. European military aircraft collaborations which are project-
specific with the partner companies retaining their identity).  Second, Airbus is not 
constrained by the commitment to raise the technological capability of the partner 
nations (eg. as occurred on collaborative military aircraft projects).  Indeed, Airbus is 
less constrained by juste retour: in fact, it is claimed that the juste retour used by 
Airbus has been beneficial in creating areas of technical expertise and specialisation 
(eg. BAE focus on wing technology for Airbus: ITC, 2001).  Third, to survive Airbus 
has to be competitive in responding to the varied and changing demands of the world 
civil aircraft market.  Unlike military collaborations, there is no guaranteed market for 
Airbus aircraft (cf. the partner nations on Eurofighter Typhoon which fund its R&D 
costs and provided firm production orders for the aircraft).              
 
On military aircraft, the US aerospace industry has the benefit of a large protected 
home market. The US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF, now the Lockheed Martin F-35) 
illustrates the scale differences between the UK, other European nations and the USA.  
The original planned requirement was 2852 JSF aircraft for the US Forces compared 
with a UK requirement for 150 aircraft.  Faced with such scale differences in military 
markets, the UK can respond by reducing unit costs compared with the USA; by 
exporting; and by international collaboration (eg. UK involvement in Eurofighter 
Typhoon and JSF).  On exports, the UK Hawk is a good example achieving both high 
output levels (over 800 aircraft) and a high proportion of output exported (almost 80% 
exported).   Similarly, Eurofighter shows how European collaboration results in 
output levels closer to those in the USA and considerably greater than European 
national scales of output.  For example, the partner nation’s planned order for 
Eurofighter is 620 units, comprising 232 units for the UK, 180 for Germany,  121 for 
Italy and 87 for Spain.  However, collaboration departs from the ‘ideal case’ leading 
to inefficiencies associated with complex international management and monitoring 
arrangements and restrictive work sharing requirements.  UK estimates suggest that 
the total development costs on the four nation Eurofighter were almost twice as high 
as an alternative national aircraft; but typically, the UKs  cost share equates to one 
third of total development costs.  Similarly, the scale economies achieved on 
collaborative production programmes are in the region of half those on national 
programmes; and delays on collaborative programmes average almost one year 
(NAO, 2001).   
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(iii)  Size of firms       
 
The US competitive advantage in the scale of output, especially for military aircraft, 
is also reflected in its advantage in firm size.  Large firms are able to obtain 
economies of scale and scope and in recent years there has been considerable merger 
activity creating larger aerospace firms.  US firms dominate the world’s top 10 
aerospace firms, accounting for 7 out of the top 10 in 1996, 2000 and 2002.  BAE 
Systems was the only UK aerospace company in the top 10 in 1996, 2000 and 2002, 
ranking fourth in each year.  In contrast, the newly-created EADS ranked third in 
2000 and second in 2002 .   
 
Table 5 shows the top 15 aerospace companies between 1996 and 2002.  Interestingly, 
9 of the top 15 companies remain unchanged throughout the period (including BAE 
Systems and Thales/Thomson-CSF). Comparisons with Boeing for 2002 show the 
scale advantage of the US company: EADS was 53% and BAE was 34% of the size of 
Boeing.  Similarly, in aero-engines in 2002, Rolls-Royce was 55% of the size of 
General Electric. Within the top 15, between 1996 and 2002, the UK and European 
firms have not achieved any substantial increase in their average size in relation to the 
top US firms.  This suggests that the US aerospace mergers after 1996 have been 
more successful in creating relatively larger firms.  Also, over this period, the UKs 
mergers have created relatively larger aerospace firms than in Europe.   
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Table 5. Top 15 Aerospace Firms 
 
                            2002                    2000                    1996 
Firm 
Ranking 
Aerospace 
Sales 
($m) 
Firm 
Ranking 
Aerospace 
Sales 
($m) 
Firm 
Ranking 
Aerospace 
Sales 
($m) 
Boeing 53,344  Boeing 51,407 Lockheed 
Martin 
26,068 
EADS (E) 28,182 Lockheed 
Martin 
23,977 Boeing 22,681 
Lockheed 
Martin 
26,562  EADS 23,336 McDonnell 
Douglas 
13,447 
 BAE 
Systems 
18,236  BAE 
Systems 
19,661  British 
Aerospace 
11,635 
 Northrop 
Grumman 
18,126 Raytheon 15,443 Aerospatiale 
(F) 
9,948 
Raytheon 17,449 United 
Technologies 
12,358 United 
Technologies 
8,852 
United 
Technologies 
13,216 General 
Electric 
10,779 DASA (G) 8,636 
General 
Electric 
11,141 Honeywell 9,988 Hughes 
Electronics 
8,314 
Honeywell 
International 
8,855 No throp 
Grumman 
7,782 Northrop 
Grumman 
8,071 
Thales (F) 8,035 Bombardier  7,112 Raytheon  7,769 
Bombardier 
( C ) 
7,194 Rolls-Royce 6,890 General 
Electric 
6,302 
General  
Dynamics 
6,970 TRW 6,237 Thomson-
CSF (F) 
6,264 
Rolls-Royce  6,179 Thales 5,977 Allied Signal 5,714 
Snecma (F) 6,130 Snecma 5,204 GEC (UK) 5,653 
Finmeccanica 
(Italy) 
5,041 Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries (J) 
4,841 Rolls-Royce 4,616 
Average size: 
UK v USA 
 
      63% 
 
      
 
   77% 
  
     61% 
Average size:  
Europe v 
USA 
 
       61% 
        
  
    67% 
  
      70% 
Average size: 
EU v UK 
   
        97% 
  
     87% 
      
       113%  
  
Notes: i) Sales figures are in current prices and are for aerospace sales only.  Most 
companies have other sales, but total sales figures are not reported here. 
 ii) C = Canada; E = Europe; F = France; G = Germany. 
 iii)  Average size of firm is based on firms in the top 15.   
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Sources: Flight (1997; 2002; 2003) 
       
(iv)  Development time-scales 
 
The time taken to develop an aircraft from start to delivery is a further indicator of 
competitiveness.  Traditionally, the US aerospace industry developed both civil and 
military aircraft faster than the UK and European industries. For example, between 
1945 and 1969, the average UK development times for military aircraft were 8 years 4 
months compared with 6 years 3 months for the USA; and for civil aircraft, the 
average development times were 4 years and 4 months and 3 years and 7 months, 
respectively (Elstub, 1969).   
 
Since 1980, the position has changed.  On large jet airliners, Airbus is now 
competitive with Boeing on development times (where Airbus involves a UK 
component on the wings, engines and other equipment).  Table 6 shows development 
times for a similar group of Airbus and Boeing civil aircraft, with similarity defined 
by their characteristics.  Airbus aircraft were developed some 4-7% faster, with 
Airbus being faster from start to first flight, but slightly slower from first flight to 
Certificate of Airworthiness. Interestingly, this evidence confirms that European 
collaboration in civil aircraft has created a competitive industrial organisation.  
Regression analysis of various measures of development time against aircraft 
characteristics, a time-trend and a country of manufacture dummy variable gave a 
significant and negative coefficient for the time-trend only.  As expected, the country 
of manufacture dummy was not significant.   
 
Table 6.  Average Development Times for Civil Aircraft 
 
Development Times 
(months) 
  Aircraft Characteristics  
Aircraft 
Start to 
first 
flight 
First 
flight 
to CoA 
Total 
Time 
Speed 
(mph) 
Weight 
   (lbs) 
Passengers 
 
Range 
(miles) 
Airbus 
(n=7) 
 
   43.4 
 
   13 
 
   56.4 
 
  595 
    
325,179   
 
       252 
 
4653 
Airbus  
(n=6) 
 
   43.8 
 
    11 
 
    54.8 
 
   602 
 
318,748 
 
       250 
 
 4716 
Boeing 
(n=7) 
 
   48.9 
 
    9.9  
 
    58.7 
 
   606 
 
388,078 
 
        240 
 
  4516 
 
Notes: 
i.  Airbus n=7 sample: A300;A310; A320; A319; A321; A340; A330.  The sample 
n=6 excluded the A300 with a first flight in 1972.  All other Airbus airliners had a 
first flight date of 1982-95. 
ii.  Boeing n=7 sample: B737 Next Generation; B747-400; B757; B767; BMD11; 
B717-200, all with first flight dates of 1981-98.   
iii.  Weight is maximum take-off weight; months are rounded to nearest month; CoA 
is award of Certificate of Airworthiness.   
 
Source: Janes (2001)    
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The traditional competitive advantage of the US industry in development times for 
military combat aircraft is shown in the following regression equation. This allows for 
combat aircraft characteristics: 
 
 TCS = 143.71 – 0.12S + 2.32W* + 0.02R + 54.40CM + 0.39T 
    (1.97)   (1.99)     (2.69)    (1.26)    (2.36)          (0.26) 
              _ 
   R2  = 0.70 
 
where TCS = total time from contract start to service (months); S = speed; W 
= weight; R = range; CM = a dummy variable for USA = 0 and rest of world = 
1; and T = a time-trend based on date of first flight.  The equation was based 
on a sample of 11 US, European, Russian and Japanese modern combat 
aircraft (see also notes to Table 7). 
 
 
The equation shows a significant and predicted positive impact of weight on 
development times; but surprisingly, other aircraft characteristics, namely, speed and 
range were not significant.    The country of manufacture dummy is almost 
significant, showing a substantial US advantage in development times (some 4.5 
years).  
 
On current generations of combat aircraft, development times are similar between 
Europe and the USA, confirming that the US no longer has a competitive advantage 
in this aspect of industry performance.  On three current generation European combat 
aircraft (Gripen; Rafale; Typhoon) average development times were 181 months 
compared with an average of 209 months for two US combat aircraft (F-22 and JSF, 
neither of which have yet entered service). Since the end of the Cold War, 
development times have been ‘stretched’ reflecting defence budget problems and less 
urgency due to a reduced threat.  Using pairwise comparisons, the European 
collaborative Typhoon has been developed in a considerably shorter time, namely, 
214 months, than the US F-22 aircraft which is due in service in late 2005 (231 
months).  Admittedly, the US F-22 is a more complex, high-performance aircraft 
which is more advanced than any of the current European combat aircraft.  Overall, 
the evidence shows that the traditional US competitive advantage on development 
times for civil and military combat aircraft no longer applies.    
 
v)  Labour hoarding   
 
The speed at which firms vary their labour force in response to changes in output is 
another indicator of their competitiveness.  A slow response suggests labour hoarding 
and labour retention policies.   Once again, the US ‘model’ is of an aerospace industry 
which adjusts its labour force quickly to variations in output.  The statistical evidence 
suggests that since 1980, the UK aerospace industry’s employment has become more 
responsive to variations in output (cf Table 7: equations (2) and (3)).  Also, the UK 
industry’s employment responsiveness to changes in output is considerably higher 
than for the French aerospace industry and similar to that for the EU industry (Table 
7: equations (1), (4) and (6)).  Moreover, whilst the UK industry’s employment 
responsiveness remains below that for the US aerospace industry, there was evidence 
of it approaching US levels.    
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Table 7.  Employment Equations      
 
Coefficients of: Dependent 
variable 
 
Constant Log 
Q 
  t Log 
Lt-1 
 
,1 
 
,11 
 
8 
  _ 
  R2 
 
 d 
1)  LogLt 
     (UK) 
3.59* 
(2.35) 
0.38** 
(5.02) 
-0.04** 
(4.74) 
0.42** 
(3.45) 
0.38 0.65 0.58 0.980 2.1 
2) LogLt 
     (UK) 
0.87 
(1.97) 
0.35** 
(5.64) 
-0.02** 
(6.62) 
0.69* 
(15.12) 
0.35 1.14 0.31 0.968 1.3 
3)  LogLt 
      (UK) 
-2.65 
 (1.21) 
0.65** 
(4.26) 
-0.02* 
(2.75) 
0.69** 
(5.35) 
0.65 2.1 0.31 0.961 1.7 
4)  LogLt 
     (EU) 
3.90** 
(4.55) 
0.41** 
(5.28) 
-0.02** 
(3.34) 
0.39** 
(4.00) 
0.41 0.67 0.61 0.988 2.1 
5)  LogLt 
     (USA) 
2.80** 
(3.88) 
0.42** 
(5.19) 
-0.003 
(1.14) 
0.46** 
(8.17) 
0.42 0.77 0.54 0.985 2.4 
6)  LogLt 
      (FR) 
4.21** 
(3.91) 
0.16* 
(2.35) 
-0.01* 
(2.34) 
0.51** 
(5.26) 
0.16 0.33 0.49 0.96 2.0 
Notes: 
i)  All equations are log linear: logLt = log a + bt + c logQ + d log Lt-1 where  ,1= c; 
,11= c/ 8; d = 1 - 8 where 8 = lagged adjustment of actual to desired employment.  
 
ii)  Lt = employment; t = an exponential time trend representing technology and the 
capital stock; Q = value of turnover in constant 1999 prices (US $  millions); Lt-1 = 
lagged dependent variable. 
 
iii)  Equations (1) and (3)  included a dummy variable for end of Cold War (not 
significant); equation  (4) included a dummy for end of Cold War in 1991 
(significant); equation (5)  included slope shift dummies for mergers and dummies for 
end of Cold War (none were significant); equation (6) also included a dummy for end 
of the Cold War (not significant). 
 
iv) Equations (1), (3), (5) and (6)  based on 1980–2000; equation (2) based on 1948-
2000; equation (4) based on 1980-1999. Equations (1), (4) and (6) use consolidated 
turnover; equations (2) and (3) use unconsolidated turnover.  
                      _ 
v)  t-ratios in brackets; R2  is adjusted for degrees of freedom; d = Durbin Watson 
statistic; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.   
 
Exports 
 
Exports and market shares are often used as major indicators of competitiveness.  In 
2000, civil and military exports accounted for 60% of the  UK aerospace industry’s 
turnover.  Civil aerospace sales  accounted for almost 55% of the UK industry’s 
turnover in 2000; and some two-thirds of this civil business was exported with civil 
aerospace exports accounting for 36% of total UK industry sales (SBAC, 2000).  On 
civil aircraft, the UK industry designs and manufactures the wings for Airbus; and UK 
firms are also suppliers of engines and equipment to Airbus, Boeing and to the 
regional aircraft manufacturers.  These exports reflect the fact that the UK is a world 
leader in wings, aero-engines and equipment some of which are represented on Airbus 
civil aircraft.  
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Airbus was a new entrant to the large jet airliner industry with its first deliveries in 
1974 to a market which had been dominated by US firms (Boeing; Lockheed; 
McDonnell Douglas in the early 1970s).  Since then Airbus has increased its share of 
the world market for large civil aircraft, achieving a 38% share in 2000 with the 
market changing from a US-dominated oligopoly to a  European-US duopoly.  Table 
8 shows the trends in Airbus penetration of the world market. Two points can be made 
about entry time and costs. First, it took Airbus 21 years to achieve a market share of 
over 30%.  Second, Airbus entry involved substantial costs for European taxpayers, 
especially in France and Germany and particularly for the Airbus A300 and A310.  
By  December 2003, Airbus had delivered 780 A300/310 aircraft compared with 2109 
units of the A320 family which is similar to Boeing scale of output for its successful 
airliners.        
 
  Table 8.  Airbus and Boeing Sales, 1974 - 2000       
 
Gross 
deliveries 
(units) 
1974 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Airbus         5      38       42        95      124      311 
Boeing 
(incldg 
McDonnell 
Douglas) 
  
    284 
     
   363 
 
    282 
 
     527 
 
      261 
 
     504 
Airbus 
share 
(%) 
 
      1.7   
 
    9.5 
 
      13.0 
 
    15.3 
 
     32.2 
 
   38.2 
 
Source: DTI (2002). 
 
The military-civil sales ratio has changed substantially since 1980 when military sales 
accounted for about 65% of the UK aerospace industry’s sales and civil sales the 
remaining 35%.  In 2000, military sales accounted for 46% of the UK aerospace 
industry’s sales, shared equally between domestic and export customers (SBAC, 
2001).   In comparison, the military-civil ratios of sales for the EU and the US 
aerospace industries were 30/70 and 40/60, respectively.   
 
Military aerospace exports dominated UK defence equipment exports  over the period 
1980 to 2000, especially in the 1990s with sales to the Middle East.  However, 
defence exports are determined by both economic and political factors which makes it 
difficult to assess competitiveness. Even standard competitiveness measures such as 
equipment prices are misleading, since they can reflect different national subsidies to 
producers, differences in national preferential  purchasing, various financial support 
arrangements (eg state export credits), offsets, a willingness by the supplying nation 
to waive R&D levies and the provision of gifts-in-kind (eg equipment and training 
free of charge).  Equipment prices can also be for the basic equipment or might 
include various amounts of spares, training and support services.  Political factors are 
also important, especially the supplying nations views on the political and military 
importance of the buying country (eg. allies and friends; ethical criteria; willingness 
of rival nations to supply).  
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Table 9 shows examples of the unit prices of various military aircraft. Amongst 
trainers, the UK Hawk appears to be competitive on price. This is confirmed by its 
status as a world leader for subsonic combat aircraft with 27% share of the world 
market compared with a 26% share for the USA over the period 1986 to 1997 (based 
on volume data: DoS, 2000).  For both trainers and combat aircraft, some of the price 
data are for aircraft in the early stages of development whilst others are for aircraft in-
service (eg.in-service aircraft at 2000 included Hawk, Gripen, F-15, F-16,  Harrier 
and SU-27).  Amongst combat aircraft, the F-16, Gripen and SU-27 are relatively 
cheap, whilst the US F-15E and F-22 are costly aircraft, but technically advanced.   
The collaborative Eurofighter Typhoon (with the UK as a partner) is cheaper than the 
US F-15 and F-22 but more expensive than Rafale. If the Lockheed Martin  JSF is  
successful and its estimated costs are achieved (major assumptions), it will be a 
competitive aircraft and a major threat to Typhoon and Rafale.    
 
  Table 9.  Military Aircraft Unit Prices      
 
                       Aircraft                  Unit Price 
                 (US$ millions)              
Trainers  
Hawk (UK)                  18-21 
MAKO (EADS)                  22-25 
KTX-2 (S. Korea)                  18-20  
Combat Aircraft       
Eurofighter  Typhoon                  68 
Rafale (France)                  58 
Gripen (Sweden)                  35 
F-15E (USA)                  75  
F-16 (USA)                   24-25 
F-18 E/F (USA)                   50 
F-22 (USA)                  183 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF:USA)                    31-38 (different versions) 
Harrier AV8B (UK-US)                    36  
Mitsubishi F-2 (Japan)                   115  
SU-27 (Russia)                     35 
 
Sources:  Various aviation and defence magazines (eg Defense News; Aviation 
Week; Janes Defence Weekly; Flight; Flug Revue; Air Forces Monthly).  All data are 
for 1999, 2000 or 2001. 
 
Statistical analysis of the determinants of UK aerospace exports was constrained  by 
the available data.  Some limited, exploratory equations were estimated and examples 
are shown in Table 10.  The time-trend variable gave the expected significant and 
positive coefficient for civil exports; but a surprising negative coefficient for total 
exports.  The end of the Cold War resulted in a negative impact on total and military 
exports.  Passenger miles gave an expected positive impact on total exports, but a 
surprising negative coefficient for civil exports.  There was no evidence of a 
‘crowding-out’ effect from UK military equipment spending.  Military equipment 
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imports were positively associated with total UK military exports, which might reflect 
the general level of demand in world military markets. 
    
Table 10.  UK Aerospace Exports. 
 
                 Coefficients of: Dependent 
Variable 
Constant 
     t Cold 
War 
Dummy 
PASM DSP MIMP 
_ 
R2 
 
  d 
1) TEXP  -6.95 
(1.89) 
-0.64** 
(3.36) 
-1.66* 
(2.72) 
0.02** 
(5.45) 
0.0002 
(0.55) 
0.20 
(0.11) 
0.93 2.1 
2)  TMX 4518.4 
(1.78) 
67.09 
(0.66) 
-1661.6* 
(2.48) 
 -0.23 
(1.21) 
2.53* 
(2.14) 
0.79 1.7 
3)  TCX 8417.7* 
(2.28) 
711.55** 
(3.54) 
-207.5 
(0.32) 
-16.33** 
(4.69) 
-0.12 
(0.73) 
 0.85 1.9 
Notes: 
i) TEXP = total UK aerospace exports; TMX = total UK military aerospace exports; 
TCX = total UK civil aerospace exports.  All value data in £ billions, 1999 prices. 
Equations (1) and (2) are based on 1980-1998; equation (3) based on 1980-2000. All 
equations are linear. 
 
ii) t = time-trend; dummy variable (1,0) for the end of the Cold War was based on 
either 1991 or 1992; PASM = world passenger miles (billions); DSP = UK military 
equipment spending; MIMP = UK military equipment imports lagged one year.   
 
iii)  Other details as in Table 7.   
 
A relatively new feature of the UK aerospace industry is its global dimension with 
both inward and outward foreign direct investment.  The UK industry has 
considerable aerospace manufacturing assets overseas.  In 2000, these subsidiaries 
recorded sales of £5.55 billion and employed 47,000 personnel outside the UK.  Some 
60% of these overseas sales and employment were located in the USA ( UK firms 
with US subsidiaries included BAE, Rolls-Royce and Smiths), so allowing UK firms 
to achieve entry into the US market, especially its defence market.  Similarly, some 
overseas companies have located in the UK or acquired UK aerospace companies (eg. 
Bombardier/Shorts; Finmeccanica/ Agusta-Westland; TRW; Thales).  As a result, the 
UK aerospace industry now comprises both UK and foreign-owned companies 
located in the UK.             
 
Profitability 
 
In competitive markets, profitability can be regarded as the final indicator of industry 
performance and competitiveness.  Over the period 1985 to 2000, the UK aerospace 
industry achieved the highest median profit rate on sales, exceeding both the EU and 
the USA.  The UK industry’s annual profitability exceeded that of the EU in twelve of 
the sixteen years and exceeded that of the USA in ten of the sixteen years. The data 
are shown in Table 11. It is, however, recognised that national aerospace markets are 
imperfect: the EU and US markets are characterised by national monopolies and 
oligopolies, respectively, and both have  national preferential purchasing policies (eg 
Buy America Act).  In principle, the UK market is different with its competitive 
procurement policy for military equipment, so that its profitability record is a more 
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accurate reflection of international competitiveness.  Moreover, the UK industry’s 
profitability record was achieved despite the US industry’s advantage with its larger 
scale output and larger firms.   
 
 
 Table 11.  Industry Profitability   
 
      Profit as percentage of sales (%) 
                           Aerospace Industry   
      Year 
 
 
 
            UK 
 
         EU 
 
        USA 
1985              5.5            5.2          3.1 
1986              5.0             4.2          2.8  
1987              4.4           3.5           4.1  
1988              3.4           3.8           4.3 
1989              4.2           3.2            3.3   
1990              2.8           2.4          3.4 
1991              2.2           2.4          1.8 
1992             -1.2          -0.6         -1.4 
1993              2.2            0.7          3.6 
1994              0.5                   0.0          4.7 
1995              5.4           0.0           3.8 
1996              4.8           2.2          5.6  
1997              6.2           3.9          5.2 
1998              6.9           6.7          5.0  
1999              6.4           6.8          6.5 
2000              6.4           4.9          4.7 
Median              4.6           3.4          4.0 
 
Sources: AECMA; SBAC; USAIA 
 
Profitability data are also available at the company level and these are shown in Table 
12, based on the year 2000.  There are two features of this Table.  First, the 
profitability of the two UK major aerospace firms, BAE and Rolls-Royce, generally 
exceeded that of their major  and much larger US rivals, namely, Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin.  Second, the profitability of some of the UK equipment suppliers 
exceeded that of the much larger UK and US companies (BAE; RR; Boeing; 
Lockheed Martin). 
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Table 11.  Company Profitability, 2000 
 
Company     Profit on sales 
             (%)  
   Profit on capital 
             (%) 
BAE               7.8              5.6 
Rolls-Royce                8.0             12.9 
GKN                8.0             24.8 
TRW               18.9              11.6 
Cobham               17.1             25.2 
Smiths               18.5             24.6 
Hunting                 2.1               13.5 
Bombardier (Shorts)               13.7                Na 
Meggitt               24.6              14.5  
Ultra Electronics               13.9              35.3 
Martin Baker               14.4               Na 
UK Sample Average                 9.6               Na 
UK Aerospace Industry 
Average 
                8.8               12.6 
Boeing                 6.6                14.2 
Lockheed Martin                 4.8                  6.0 
 
Note:  Sample average is for all the UK companies shown in the Table; UK Industry 
average is based on UK companies in top 100 aerospace companies (Flight 2001b) 
 
Sources:  SBAC (2000); Flight (2001 b) 
 
Conclusion 
 
The UK aerospace industry is the largest in the EU.  The USA is the UK industry’s 
major rival and provides the ‘benchmark’ for assessing its performance.  On this basis 
and using the indicators reviewed in this paper, the UK industry improved its 
competitiveness over the period 1980 to 2000.  There were improvements in labour 
productivity, output levels, development times, employment responsiveness and 
export performance.  The results are summarised in Table 12. 
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 Table 12.  Competitiveness Indicators, 1980-2000   
 
Indicator  UK industry performance relative to 
USA 
1.  Labour productivity  Improving 
2.  Output (a) Civil 
                  (b)  Military 
Airbus achieving US scales of output 
UK/JSF = US scales of output 
Eurofighter = higher output 
3.  Development times US no longer has competitive advantage 
4.  Labour hoarding UK employment responsiveness has 
improved and is approaching US  
levels. 
5.  Exports a. Military aerospace exports dominated 
UK defence exports; 
b.  World leader for subsonic combat 
aircraft; 
c. Airbus: rising share of world market   
6.  Industry profitability Higher than USA 
 
Statistical indicators confirm past and current performance and competitiveness, but 
do not guarantee future successful competitiveness.  The main problems facing the 
UK aerospace industry arise from the lack of new R&D programmes to provide the 
next generation of projects.  Some of this new R&D will require government funding 
(IGT, 2003).  Technical change is also a challenge to the future UK aerospace firm.  
The possible emergence of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) could 
revolutionise air warfare and lead to the end of manned combat aircraft and an 
increased emphasis on electronics and electronic warfare.  For civil aircraft, the UKs 
future looks to be through an involvement in collaborative Airbus programmes. 
However, the 2005 WTO dispute between the EU and USA raises doubts about the 
future of UK (and European) Government repayable launch investment for civil 
aircraft programmes (TIC, 2005).  Also, the future absence of any UK-designed 
military and civil aircraft will mean the increasing importance of its equipment 
suppliers.              
 
Benchmarking against the US aerospace industry and continued competition with its 
US rivals will provide a major competitive stimulus for the UK aerospace industry.  
Evidence suggests that “…the more a given manufacturing industry is exposed to the 
world’s best practice high productivity industry, the higher its relative productivity 
(the closer it is to the leader).  Competition with the productivity leader encourages 
higher productivity” (Bailey and Solow, 2001).  On this basis, part of an industry’s 
productivity disadvantage reflects organisational slack and/or reluctance to change 
and innovate.  Failure by the UK aerospace industry to adjust to change will mean 
more exits and the loss of its world leader companies.   
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